Central Library

Normal view MARC view ISBD view

On the Physical Security of Physically Unclonable Functions [electronic resource] / by Shahin Tajik.

By: Tajik, Shahin [author.].
Contributor(s): SpringerLink (Online service).
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookSeries: T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services: Publisher: Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2019Edition: 1st ed. 2019.Description: XX, 79 p. 36 illus., 24 illus. in color. online resource.Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9783319758206.Subject(s): Electronic circuits | Security systems | Microprogramming  | Signal processing | Electronic Circuits and Systems | Security Science and Technology | Control Structures and Microprogramming | Signal, Speech and Image ProcessingAdditional physical formats: Printed edition:: No title; Printed edition:: No title; Printed edition:: No titleDDC classification: 621.3815 Online resources: Click here to access online
Contents:
Introduction -- Background -- Experimental Setup -- Photonic Side-Channel Analysis -- Laser Fault Injection -- Optical Contactless Probing -- Conclusion.
In: Springer Nature eBookSummary: This book investigates the susceptibility of intrinsic physically unclonable function (PUF) implementations on reconfigurable hardware to optical semi-invasive attacks from the chip backside. It explores different classes of optical attacks, particularly photonic emission analysis, laser fault injection, and optical contactless probing. By applying these techniques, the book demonstrates that the secrets generated by a PUF can be predicted, manipulated or directly probed without affecting the behavior of the PUF. It subsequently discusses the cost and feasibility of launching such attacks against the very latest hardware technologies in a real scenario. The author discusses why PUFs are not tamper-evident in their current configuration, and therefore, PUFs alone cannot raise the security level of key storage. The author then reviews the potential and already implemented countermeasures, which can remedy PUFs’ security-related shortcomings and make them resistant to optical side-channel and optical fault attacks. Lastly, by making selected modifications to the functionality of an existing PUF architecture, the book presents a prototype tamper-evident sensor for detecting optical contactless probing attempts.
    average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)
No physical items for this record

Introduction -- Background -- Experimental Setup -- Photonic Side-Channel Analysis -- Laser Fault Injection -- Optical Contactless Probing -- Conclusion.

This book investigates the susceptibility of intrinsic physically unclonable function (PUF) implementations on reconfigurable hardware to optical semi-invasive attacks from the chip backside. It explores different classes of optical attacks, particularly photonic emission analysis, laser fault injection, and optical contactless probing. By applying these techniques, the book demonstrates that the secrets generated by a PUF can be predicted, manipulated or directly probed without affecting the behavior of the PUF. It subsequently discusses the cost and feasibility of launching such attacks against the very latest hardware technologies in a real scenario. The author discusses why PUFs are not tamper-evident in their current configuration, and therefore, PUFs alone cannot raise the security level of key storage. The author then reviews the potential and already implemented countermeasures, which can remedy PUFs’ security-related shortcomings and make them resistant to optical side-channel and optical fault attacks. Lastly, by making selected modifications to the functionality of an existing PUF architecture, the book presents a prototype tamper-evident sensor for detecting optical contactless probing attempts.

There are no comments for this item.

Log in to your account to post a comment.