000 03665nam a22004215i 4500
001 978-3-658-00983-0
003 DE-He213
005 20200420211741.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 130618s2014 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9783658009830
_9978-3-658-00983-0
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-658-00983-0
_2doi
050 4 _aHB71-74
072 7 _aKC
_2bicssc
072 7 _aBUS000000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a330
_223
100 1 _aScherf, Gundbert.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aFinancial Stability Policy in the Euro Zone
_h[electronic resource] :
_bThe Political Economy of National Banking Regulation in an Integrating Monetary Union /
_cby Gundbert Scherf.
264 1 _aWiesbaden :
_bSpringer Fachmedien Wiesbaden :
_bImprint: Springer Gabler,
_c2014.
300 _aXX, 256 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 _aA Political Economy Perspective on European Banking Regulation -- Varieties of Financial Systems and Regulatory Preferences -- Banking Regulation in an Integrating Financial Market -- Time Consistency Problems in the Interaction of Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy.
520 _aBanking regulation is an economically powerful and politically very salient instrument of economic policy. After all, the financial crisis had derived from an over-leveraged banking system obviating the importance of banking regulation for the functioning of regulatory capitalism. Gundbert Scherf's research focuses on this nexus between integrated banking, supranational monetary policy and national banking regulation. He finds that national level differences in financial systems and related institutions explain and drive variation in regulatory financial stability policy across countries. Applying game-theoretical rigor to political economy interactions, Gundbert Scherf develops a model of time-inconsistent supervisory policy as well as international competition in regulatory standards. He shows how these patterns lead to financial instability, by analyzing the original members of the Euro Zone as well as the US and the UK in the years leading up to the financial crisis of 2007/8.     Contents �         Varieties of financial systems and regulatory preferences �         Banking regulation in an integrating financial market �         Interaction of banking supervision and monetary policy �         Time consistency problems in supervisory policy      Target Groups �         Researchers and students in the fields of economics, political economy, and finance interested in financial systems, regulation and supervisory policy �         Central bankers, regulators, and executives in banking and finance    The Author Dr. Gundbert Scherf wrote his dissertation under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Henrik Enderlein, Chair of Political Economy, at the Freie Universit�at Berlin.
650 0 _aEconomics.
650 0 _aManagement science.
650 1 4 _aEconomics.
650 2 4 _aEconomics, general.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783658009823
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-00983-0
912 _aZDB-2-SBE
942 _cEBK
999 _c50694
_d50694