000 03954nam a22005415i 4500
001 978-3-031-01558-8
003 DE-He213
005 20240730163426.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 220601s2012 sz | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9783031015588
_9978-3-031-01558-8
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-031-01558-8
_2doi
050 4 _aQ334-342
050 4 _aTA347.A78
072 7 _aUYQ
_2bicssc
072 7 _aCOM004000
_2bisacsh
072 7 _aUYQ
_2thema
082 0 4 _a006.3
_223
100 1 _aChalkiadakis, Georgios.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
_978439
245 1 0 _aComputational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory
_h[electronic resource] /
_cby Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, Michael Wooldridge.
250 _a1st ed. 2012.
264 1 _aCham :
_bSpringer International Publishing :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2012.
300 _aXVI, 150 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aSynthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning,
_x1939-4616
505 0 _aIntroduction -- Basic Concepts -- Representations and Algorithms -- Weighted Voting Games -- Beyond Characteristic Function Games -- Coalition Structure Formation -- Advanced Topics.
520 _aCooperative game theory is a branch of (micro-)economics that studies the behavior of self-interested agents in strategic settings where binding agreements among agents are possible. Our aim in this book is to present a survey of work on the computational aspects of cooperative game theory. We begin by formally defining transferable utility games in characteristic function form, and introducing key solution concepts such as the core and the Shapley value. We then discuss two major issues that arise when considering such games from a computational perspective: identifying compact representations for games, and the closely related problem of efficiently computing solution concepts for games. We survey several formalisms for cooperative games that have been proposed in the literature, including, for example, cooperative games defined on networks, as well as general compact representation schemes such as MC-nets and skill games. As a detailed case study, we consider weighted voting games:a widely-used and practically important class of cooperative games that inherently have a natural compact representation. We investigate the complexity of solution concepts for such games, and generalizations of them. We briefly discuss games with non-transferable utility and partition function games. We then overview algorithms for identifying welfare-maximizing coalition structures and methods used by rational agents to form coalitions (even under uncertainty), including bargaining algorithms. We conclude by considering some developing topics, applications, and future research directions.
650 0 _aArtificial intelligence.
_93407
650 0 _aMachine learning.
_91831
650 0 _aNeural networks (Computer science) .
_978440
650 1 4 _aArtificial Intelligence.
_93407
650 2 4 _aMachine Learning.
_91831
650 2 4 _aMathematical Models of Cognitive Processes and Neural Networks.
_932913
700 1 _aElkind, Edith.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
_978441
700 1 _aWooldridge, Michael.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
_978442
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
_978443
773 0 _tSpringer Nature eBook
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031004308
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031026867
830 0 _aSynthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning,
_x1939-4616
_978444
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01558-8
912 _aZDB-2-SXSC
942 _cEBK
999 _c84591
_d84591