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020 _a9783031792663
_9978-3-031-79266-3
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-031-79266-3
_2doi
050 4 _aQ334-342
050 4 _aTA347.A78
072 7 _aUYQ
_2bicssc
072 7 _aCOM004000
_2bisacsh
072 7 _aUYQ
_2thema
082 0 4 _a006.3
_223
100 1 _aParekh, Abhey.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
_979095
245 1 0 _aSharing Network Resources
_h[electronic resource] /
_cby Abhey Parekh, Jean Walrand.
250 _a1st ed. 2014.
264 1 _aCham :
_bSpringer International Publishing :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2014.
300 _aXVIII, 132 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aSynthesis Lectures on Learning, Networks, and Algorithms,
_x2690-4314
520 _aResource Allocation lies at the heart of network control. In the early days of the Internet the scarcest resource was bandwidth, but as the network has evolved to become an essential utility in the lives of billions, the nature of the resource allocation problem has changed. This book attempts to describe the facets of resource allocation that are most relevant to modern networks. It is targeted at graduate students and researchers who have an introductory background in networking and who desire to internalize core concepts before designing new protocols and applications. We start from the fundamental question: what problem does network resource allocation solve? This leads us, in Chapter 1, to examine what it means to satisfy a set of user applications that have different requirements of the network, and to problems in Social Choice Theory. We find that while capturing these preferences in terms of utility is clean and rigorous, there are significant limitations to this choice. Chapter 2 focuses on sharing divisible resources such as links and spectrum. Both of these resources are somewhat atypical -- a link is most accurately modeled as a queue in our context, but this leads to the analytical intractability of queueing theory, and spectrum allocation methods involve dealing with interference, a poorly understood phenomenon. Chapters 3 and 4 are introductions to two allocation workhorses: auctions and matching. In these chapters we allow the users to game the system (i.e., to be strategic), but don't allow them to collude. In Chapter 5, we relax this restriction and focus on collaboration. Finally, in Chapter 6, we discuss the theoretical yet fundamental issue of stability. Here, our contribution is mostly on making a mathematically abstruse subdiscipline more accessible without losing too much generality.
650 0 _aArtificial intelligence.
_93407
650 0 _aCooperating objects (Computer systems).
_96195
650 0 _aProgramming languages (Electronic computers).
_97503
650 0 _aTelecommunication.
_910437
650 1 4 _aArtificial Intelligence.
_93407
650 2 4 _aCyber-Physical Systems.
_932475
650 2 4 _aProgramming Language.
_939403
650 2 4 _aCommunications Engineering, Networks.
_931570
700 1 _aWalrand, Jean.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
_979096
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
_979097
773 0 _tSpringer Nature eBook
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031792656
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031792670
830 0 _aSynthesis Lectures on Learning, Networks, and Algorithms,
_x2690-4314
_979098
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-79266-3
912 _aZDB-2-SXSC
942 _cEBK
999 _c84715
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